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Abstract 
In this paper I examine a taxpayer utility function determined by the extended set of variables – i.e. consumption, 
labor and tax-evasion propensity. This constitutes the main framework for the analysis of taxpayer’s decision 
making process under assumption that in the economy there exist two main reduction methods: a) access to tax 
optimization techniques, which may decrease effective tax burden and are fully compliant with binding laws, but 
generate transactional costs and 2) possibility of fiscal fraud – in particular tax evasion, as the alternative 
method of reducing tax due, which has no direct transactional costs, but involves tax litigation risk.  
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Introduction 
One of the pivotal problems of both contemporary public economics and economic policy is 
the optimal taxation issue in relation to income, estate and consumption expenses. This covers 
various research pursuits, among others: optimal income tax schemes, setting effective tax 
incentives and exemptions, defining institutional framework to protect government revenue 
sources from fraudulent behavior or economic models describing taxpayer’s decision making 
process towards tax authorities.  
J. A. Mirrlees is deemed one of the founders of contemporary optimal taxation theory. In his 
pioneer  article  (Mirrlees,  1971,  p.  176)  he  conceived  a  general  mathematical  model  for 
maximization of social welfare for conceptual society consisting of individuals maximizing 
their individual utility functions, determined by time spent for work (denoted as labor – which 
generates some taxable income) and by the level of consumption.  
Further articles led to extensions of Mirrleesian model. Among others, Sadka (1976) proved 
that for an optimum of welfare state  function with  consideration of individual taxpayers’ 
utility functions under fiscal target  constraints (i.e. achieving a set level of income to be 
collected for the central budget) induced the marginal income tax rate at the level higher than 
0%, but lower than 100%.  
Cremer,  Pestieau  and  Rochet  (2001)  analyzed  the  effectiveness  of  direct  taxation  in 
comparison with indirect taxation subject to heterogeneous structure of individuals’ income 
capability.  In  one  of  the  more  recent  results  (Simula  and  Trannoy,  2010,  p.  172) 
                                                 
1 Mgr Paweł Pankiewicz is a PhD student at the Department of Finance, University of Economics in Krakow, he 
is also a tax specialist at Tele-Fonika Kable Sp. z o.o. S.K.A., Wielicka 114 Street, 30-663 Krakow, e-mail: 
pankiewiczpawel@gmail.com.      
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Mirrleesianassumption regarding closed economy environment was repealed and the effects 
of top-earners migration on optimal taxation strategies were thoroughly analyzed.  
Optimal non-linear taxation models were also examined subject to tax evasion phenomena
2, 
the most interesting of which cover the psychological and sociological determinants of 
fraudulent behavior in relation to tax authorities (Dell’Anno, 2009, p. 989-990).  
Notwithstanding  the  existence  of  robust  papers  on  tax  fraud  effects  on  determination  of 
optimal tax schemes (both globally and for individual taxpayers), little thought was spared for 
the sole formal construction of individual utility function, which would (provided still the 
most general form possible) cover not only standard determinants such as consumption, labor 
and wage, but also institutional environment in which a taxpayer operates, in particular the 
access to the tax advisory services (and some of its unique features, such as tax optimization – 
which may effectively reduce tax levied on taxpayer’s income) and the existence of tax fraud 
possibilities  (which  also  reduces  effective  tax  rate,  but  simultaneously  generates  risk  of 
litigation).  
This  paper  consists  of  four  parts.  Firstly,  I  outline  the  necessary  assumptions  for  formal 
definition of the model to be used throughout the text. In the second part, there is an analysis 
of an individual taxpayer decision making problem in particular –  is it economically rational 
to use tax advisory services and/or tax evasion methods to optimize effective tax rate for 
income? If so, to which extent should these techniques be facilitated? In the third part, the 
individual propensity for tax evasion is examined more profoundly and some characteristics 
are set. Finally, I pose conclusions emerging from the research with indications for further 
study.  
 
The model 
The maximization of the individual taxpayer utility usually involves a standard two-variable 
function of labor and consumption, broadly explored in literature (Ebert, 1992, p. 50). In this 
section the function will be expanded with additional variable to be facilitated throughout the 
analysis. 
 
Let us have: 
  ) , , (  l c u y  , where   and   within  .  (1) 
where:  c  =  level of consumption achieved by the taxpayer 
  l  =  amount of time spent on labor 
    =  tax-payer’s individual tax-evasion propensity,   
       
The  abovementioned  constitutes  the  individual  taxpayer  utility  function  with  tax-evasion 
propensity determinant. Suppose that a given taxpayer is in disposal of overall time available 
at t – level. This must be shared between labor ( l ) and rest ( r ). Further in the text it is 
assumed that every unit of time spent on labor generates some nominal income at -level. 
Apart from this, taxpayer obtains additional incomes from numerous sources (for instance: 
social  security  support,  donations  etc.)  which  amount  to  the  level  of  m.  To  render  the 
                                                 
2  One  shall  distinguish  clearly  tax  evasion  from  tax  avoidance.  The  first  term  denotes    any  unlawful  and 
unethical operations which contributes to the effective reduction of tax burden (for instance, through hiding part 
of taxable income from tax authorities). The second term may not necessarily be illicit; it embraces all strategies 
(for instance – through tax optimization methods) which serve reducing tax due under all constraints emerging 
from institutional surrounding and commonly accepted codes of conduct.       
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calculations more manageable, it is assumed that m is subject to the taxation within the same 
scheme as is the labor-induced income.  
The assumption that   enables the examination of partial derivatives signs. Priorly 
however, we shall  introduce three axioms which stem from general economic theory: 
1)  all else equal, increase in consumption leads to increase in the level of total utility; 
continuous  increase  of  achieved  consumption,  marginal  utility  with  respect  to 
consumption decreases (maintaining positive sign within its domain),  
2)  all else equal, increase in time value spent on labor generates decrease in total utility, 
3)  all else equal, increase in tax-evasion propensity level generates increase in total utility 
achieved; however, continuous increasing this factor summons marginal utility with 
respect  to  it  decreasing  and  may  potentially  attain  negative  values  (which 
consequently leads to decrease in total utility on exceeding some critical value .  
Additionally, it is assumed later in the analysis that:  
1)  all income after taxation is spent by a taxpayer on consumption (commodities and 
services) which is aggregately shown in the level of actual consumption of a perfect 
commodity ( c ); the commodity is purchased at the fixed price p. One may find this 
assumption slightly unrealistic, though formally it is feasible to transform an entire 
bunch of goods acquired with different market prices as one through weighted mean, 
2)  every  taxpayer  has  some  individual  propensity  for  tax  evasion;  this  assumption  is 
likely to rise numerous controversies, though the phenomenon of taxpayers actually 
perpetrating  tax  law  to  benefit  from  reduced  or  eliminated  taxation  remains 
undisputed. In the following model the taxpayer chooses the value of  which denotes 
his individual attitude towards tax evasion. More specifically, it shows what part of 
taxable income the taxpayer hides from levying tax. Such conduct obviously increases 
the level of disposable income, while simultaneously increasing the risk of launching 
tax litigation or tax control against taxpayer. These procedures may result in issuing 
decisions with penal tax amounts to be paid
3, 
3)  all incomes are subject to a fixed tax rate at the level of .  
4)  every taxpayer has access to tax advisory services, through which he can implement 
beneficial and fully legal optimization strategy. This can reduce the effective tax rate 
levied upon income to the level of  . However, using such services generates 
some costs at the level of cT, 
5)  the  risk  of  issuing  penal  tax  decisions  and  other  fiscal  consequences  are  denoted 
within the model as a decrease in amount of gross income dependent on  and some 
factor  > 0
4. 
 
The optimization problem 
The  rational  taxpayer  struggles  to  maximize  his  individual  utility  function  under  budget 
constraint. Formally it is denoted as follows: 
 
                                                 
3 In Poland, all incomes which have been hidden from taxation and found during tax control are subject to penal 
rate at the level of 75%. In the analysis we neglect some other forms of penalisation such as late payment 
penalties or sanctions resulting from fiscal penal codes. 
4   is defined as the average rate of penalization during some fiscal period.      
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(2) 
 
To examine the solvability of the problem (2) it is convenient to use the Langrange multipliers 
method.  
In the first step the Langrangian function is defined as: 
 
  (3) 
where :    =  Lagrange multiplier.    
  =  Lagrangian function   
 
The first-order conditions (FOC) of maximum existence for the function L require that all 
first-order partial derivatives of the function with respect to all variables l, c and   and to the 
multiplier   equal zero. Formally: 
 
 
(4) 
Differentiating then yields: 
 
 
(5) 
 
The second-order condition for maximum is satisfied if the following inequalities are true 
[Tokarski, 2011, p. 36]: 
 
  (6) 
 
where:   mi  =  i-th minor principle of H(L) 
 
           H(L)  =  the bordered Hessian of Lagrangian L   
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H(L) is represented as: 
 
 
(7) 
 
The individual propensity for tax evasion 
What determines the level of  ? Are there any conditions which would rationalize taxpayer’s 
behavior leading to tax fraud, regardless of both ethical and moral objections? To answer 
these questions, one may examine the formula for the value of   at the stationary point of 
Lagrangian L.  
Firstly, it is necessary to facilitate first-order condition equations: 
 
 
(8) 
 
Proposition 1. 
In the stationary point of lagrangian L(c,l,) the optimal value of   is determined by the 
equation: 
 
(9) 
Proof. 
With some transformations of (8) it yields: 
 
 
(10) 
 
So :  
 
(11) 
 
which finally leads to (9), completing the proof.      
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Having  the  formula  for  individual  tax-evasion  propensity,  one  may  enquire  about  the 
conditions for its positive values.
5 This is denoted as: 
 
Proposition 2.  
 
  (12) 
where: MRS =  marginal rate of substitution of consumption with respect  
      to labor.  
 
 
Proof.  
For   it suffices that both numerator and denominator are simultaneously positive or 
negative (with additional restriction, that denominator is other than 0). On the basis of the 
previous assumptions there is:   and   and other parameters are by definition 
positive, so the only condition which must be met is that the nominator is higher than 0. In 
other words: 
 
(13) 
As  , it is possible to use a more convenient notation with modulus:  
 
 
 
(14) 
After dividing by   one yields: 
 
 
(15) 
 
By dint of definition of MRS, it is finally: 
 
  (15) 
which completes the proof. 
 
The yielded results can be interpreted as follows: 
                                                 
5  Cases  in  which    give  insight  into  the  phenomenon  which  can  be  described  literally  as  fraud 
rationalization.  Taxpayer’s  behavior  involving  some  non-zero  levels  of  tax  evasion  propensity  may  be 
economically relevant and rational, regardless of the moral and ethical objections. However, 2-way reduction of 
costs and risk connected with tax frauds (on the side of government by means of reducing financing of tax 
administration to ensure maximum compliance, on the site of taxpayers – by means of stability, trust and well-
established business environment) increases social welfare in Pareto sense (Bayer and Sutter, 2009, p. 527).       
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1)  tax-evasion becomes rational from taxpayer’s point of view in all cases in which the 
marginal rate of substitution of consumption with respect to labor is less (as modulus) 
than real wage rate for the time unit spent on labor after taxation,  
2)  facilitating effective tax optimization (by means of tax advisory) becomes a relatively 
diminishing factor for individual tax-evasion propensity in as high degree, as lesser 
becomes the effective, optimized tax rate  . 
 
Conclusions 
The model presented in this paper was a short example of optimization problem solving for an 
individual taxpayer seeking opportunities to reduce his effective tax rate on income.  
The highlighted problem of embracing in such analyses factors like tax frauds or tax advisory 
usage shall be extended and more thoroughly examined in further studies. For instance, the 
problems to be reviewed entail: 
1)  the behavior of taxpayer in the surrounding of different levels of tax advisory services 
available with prices highly at variance, 
2)  the  maximization  of  taxpayer’s  utility  function  with  access  to  transfers  from  tax 
havens, 
3)  the  extension  of  analysis  regarding  government  decisions  in  answer  to  taxpayers 
behavior  and  tendencies;  this  might  involve  mathematical  apparatus  for  non-
cooperative, zero-sum games.  
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